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Abstract— Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have increas-
ingly been adopted for safety, security, and rescue missions, for
which they need precise and reliable pose estimates relative to
their environment. To ensure mission safety when relying on
visual perception, it is essential to have an approach to assess
the integrity of the visual localization solution. However, to
the best of our knowledge, such an approach does not exist for
optimization-based visual localization. Receiver autonomous in-
tegrity monitoring (RAIM) has been widely used in global nav-
igation satellite systems (GNSS) applications such as automated
aircraft landing. In this paper, we propose a novel approach
inspired by RAIM to monitor the integrity of optimization-
based visual localization and calculate the protection level of a
state estimate, i.e. the largest possible translational error in each
direction. We also propose a metric that quantitatively evaluates
the performance of the error bounds. Finally, we validate the
protection level using the EuRoC dataset and demonstrate
that the proposed protection level provides a significantly more
reliable bound than the commonly used 3σ method.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have
found success in challenging applications such as event
safety, search and rescue, and security surveillance. For some
specific operating domains such as indoors, underground or
in urban centers, global navigation satellite systems (GNSS)
information is not always available or reliable onboard the
UAV. Hence, the feasibility of UAV deployment in these
locales depends highly on the accuracy of the vision-based
localization as a complement and replacement to GNSS
systems. Failure to correctly perform the localization task
with the sensors available to the UAV might lead to serious
damage to the vehicle or to people in the vicinity. It is
therefore imperative to not only perform accurate UAV
localization with visual information, but to understand the re-
liability of the current localization estimate and to minimize
the possibility of undetected failures in the visual localization
process.
Many UAV visual localization or visual simultaneous
localization and mapping (SLAM) algorithms have been
developed that can provide robust state estimation over an
extended period of time, such as [1], [2]. Although these
algorithms are able to operate with a low failure rate, it
remains possible to further improve the robustness of UAV
state estimation by continuously assessing the integrity of the
state estimate computed onboard the UAV. Integrity measures
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the degree of trust that can be placed on the correctness of
the localization solution [3].
In robot visual localization, 3σ (±3 standard deviations)
is often used as a measure of the uncertainty bounds on
state estimates, which corresponds to a 99.7% probability
that the ground truth state is within the region. However,
3σ only bounds the error of the state assuming there are no
outliers in the measurements, that is, no measurements are
drawn from outside the modeled measurement distribution.
For real-life UAV visual localization, it is unreasonable to
assume that the visual front-end works perfectly and there
are never any outliers in the measurements at any time, as
visual front-ends rely on correspondence of features from
frame to frame, a process that is susceptible to error. As a
result, the 3σ approach is often too aggressive and does not
bound the error of the true state of the UAV.
The work of this paper is inspired by received autonomous
integrity monitoring (RAIM) which is an integrity monitor-
ing algorithm developed to assess the integrity of the GNSS
signals. It is especially used in automated aircraft landing
and other safety-critical GNSS applications. RAIM first uses
redundant measurements to check the consistency of the
measurements received, and detects possible faulty measure-
ments from individual satellites. Afterwards, it determines a
Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) and a Vertical Protection
Level (VPL), which are the maximum errors in horizontal
and vertical directions that the fault detection algorithm is
not expected to detect [4]. The idea of adapting RAIM for
robot localization has been recently developed for filter-
based algorithms [5], [6], but not for optimization-based
algorithms.
Although integrity monitoring is a well-developed area
for GNSS applications, it is still non-trivial to adapt it in
optimization-based UAV visual localization. Firstly, in most
of the UAV visual localization algorithms, the system relies
on features to provide measurements instead of satellites,
and there are considerably more measurements compared
with GNSS applications. Secondly, in RAIM, it is rare
for two satellites to be faulty at the same time. However,
for visual localization, the absolute number of incorrect
measurements, or outliers, is much higher, and the outlier
ratio can often be greater than 10%. As a result, a different
outlier rejection method is needed to handle multiple outliers.
In addition, in GNSS applications, each satellite provides one
measurement, but in visual localization, each feature gives
2 or 3 measurements for the monocular and rectified stereo
cases, respectively.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to monitor the
integrity of the state estimation in optimization-based UAV
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
08
53
7v
1 
 [c
s.R
O]
  1
8 S
ep
 20
19
visual localization. We first detect and isolate inconsistent
visual measurements using a statistical method that is based
on [7] and expands on our previous work [8]. We then
calculate the largest translational error that can exist in the
state of the UAV. The main contributions of this paper are:
• A novel metric called relaxed bound tightness that
quantitatively evaluates the performance of error bounds
for applications where the error is assumed to follow a
Gaussian distribution.
• An approach to determine an approximate upper bound
of the error in the state estimation of the UAV in
optimization-based visual localization that is signifi-
cantly more reliable than the typical 3σ approach.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows: related
work is discussed in Sec. II, details of the outlier rejec-
tion and protection calculation algorithms are discussed in
Sec. III, the proposed metric for evaluating error bounds
is shown in Sec. IV, and finally, validation results of the
proposed approach are shown in Sec. V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
The concept of integrity monitoring has been developed
and applied to GNSS applications. It is a necessary com-
ponent for safety-critical applications where unreliable so-
lutions might lead to serious injury or death. RAIM is one
of the more commonly used integrity monitoring algorithms
for aviation applications. It has two basic functions. The
first is to detect whether there is a satellite failure using
fault detection and exclusion algorithm. The second is to
calculate the HPL and VPL, which are the largest horizontal
and vertical errors that the fault detection algorithm is not
expected to detect [9]. Brown et al. [10] propose the first
mathematically rigorous RAIM algorithm, which uses statis-
tical theory to check the consistency of the redundant GPS
measurements and calculates the HPL with the measurement
group that provides adequate consistency. Walter et al. [4] use
Brown’s method as a basis to develop weighted RAIM. The
main idea of their work is that the measurements coming
from each individual satellite have different levels of noise.
As a result, instead of assuming a fixed covariance value
for all the satellites, they propose to trust the measurements
from satellites differently by assigning noise with weighted
covariance to the measurement models of different satellites.
Both methods assume that there is at most one faulty mea-
surement in the system after the fault detection algorithm,
and then they calculate the protection levels based on this
assumption. Angus [11] revise the algorithms proposed by
Brown and Walter to take account of multiple faulty satellites
in the measurements. The ability to handle multiple faulty
measurements is useful in the context of visual localization
because each feature corresponds to 2 or 3 measurements
depending on the camera settings. As a result, to take account
of 1 faulty feature in visual localization, we need to take
account of 2 or 3 faulty measurements.
B. Vision-Based Localization
Vision-based localization or SLAM algorithms can be
divided into two main categories, direct method or feature-
based method. Direct methods process the entire image
as the measurement and aim to minimize the photometric
error [12]. Feature-based methods extract keypoints from
the image and the objective is to minimize reprojection
error. ORB-SLAM2 [1] is a state-of-the-art feature-based
SLAM system for monocular, stereo, and RGB-D cameras.
Its SLAM mode performs bundle adjustment to construct the
map. ORB-SLAM2 also has a localization mode that allows
the reuse of the map to determine the state of the agent by
pose optimization. In addition, combining visual and inertial
measurements also shows improvement in the performance
especially for UAV applications. such as [2]. Although these
algorithms show promising performance in experiments, it
is unreasonable to assume that the measurements are fault-
free at all times because finding correspondences of features
from frame to frame is a process that is susceptible to error
especially in a dynamic environment. The work of this paper
is mainly applicable to feature-based visual localization
method, and we use the localization mode of ORB-SLAM2
to validate our method, which is shown in Sec. V.
C. Outlier Rejection For Visual Measurements
RANSAC [13] has been widely used in vision-based
robot localization [14] to reject feature outliers. The basic
idea of RANSAC is to use random sets of samples to
form hypotheses and use the other samples to verify these
hypotheses, and the hypothesis with the highest consensus
is selected to be the inlier set [15]. An alternative ap-
proach is to use statistical tests to check if the measure-
ment set fits the assumed statistical model, such as Parity
Space Approach [8], and Normalized Innovation Squared
(NIS) [16]. These two methods both assume the noise of
the measurement model follows a Gaussian distribution and
check whether the weighted sum of squares residual follows
a χ2 distribution. Parity Space Approach does not require
the state of the system and it checks the consistency of a
group of redundancy measurements by projecting them into
the parity space [8]. On the other hand, NIS assumes that an
estimated state is known, and it is usually used to check if
individual measurement is an outlier. Tong et al. [7] propose
a batch innovation test that extends NIS to remove outliers
for a batch of measurements. Recently, Tzoumas et al. [17]
propose an adaptive trimming algorithm that also removes
outliers based on the value of residuals. Instead of using a
fixed threshold, the threshold in this algorithm updates for
each iteration. In this paper, we adapt Tong’s method and use
it with the Parity Space Approach to remove multiple outliers
iteratively, which leads to the calculation of protection level.
III. INTEGRITY MONITORING FRAMEWORK
A. Problem Formulation
In this section, we show the problem formulation for stereo
camera settings. We formulate the vision-based localization
as a nonlinear pose optimization. The objective is to deter-
mine the camera state at the current frame by minimizing
the reprojection error of features. We follow the notation
introduced by Barfoot [18]. There are two frames, the inertial
frame Fi, and the camera frame Fc which corresponds to
the left camera center. The state of the camera is defined as
x ={rcii , Cci}, which is the transformation from the inertial
frame to the camera frame, where rcii ∈ R3 and Cci ∈ SO(3).
Before performing localization, a map is built with features,
and rpjii denotes the position of the feature j in the inertial
frame. The feature position is transformed from the inertial
frame to the camera frame first and then projected to the
image coordinate plane using the following equations:
rpjcc =
xy
z
 = Cci(rpjii − rcii ) (1)
ulvl
δd
 = pi(rpjcc ) = 1z
fuxfvy
fub
+
cucv
0
+ ej (2)
ej ∼ N (0, Qj) (3)
where ul, vl are the left image coordinates, δd is the disparity,
fu, fv are the focal length, cu, cv are the principle points, b
is the baseline, pi is the stereo camera projection function,
and ej is the measurement noise that is assumed to follow
a Gaussian distribution with covariance matrix Qj . At each
frame, the pose optimization can be formulated as follows:
x∗ =
{
rci∗i ,C
∗
ci
}
= arg min
rcii ,Cci
∑
j
ρ(eTy,jQ
−1
j ey,j) (4)
where ρ is the Huber loss function, and ey,j is the measure-
ment error term for feature j and can be determined using
the formula below:
ey,j(x) = yj − pi(Cci(rpjii − rcii )) (5)
where yj is the measurement for feature j.
B. Fault Detection and Exclusion
This subsection shows how to apply fault detection and
exclusion to visual measurements in a manner inspired by
RAIM [4] using Parity Space Method. First, we have the
measurement model for each feature j:
yj = hj(x) + ej (6)
where the measurement function for feature j is hj(x) :
R6 ⇒ R3, defined as
hj(x) = pi(Cci(r
pji
i − rcii )). (7)
Then we linearize the measurement function hj(x) about
an operating point x0 to obtain the linearized measurement
model:
dyj = Hj · dx + ej (8)
where dx ∈ R6 is the state perturbation, H ∈ R3×6 is the
Jacobian of the measurement model, and dyj ∈ R3 is the
shifted measurements according to the operating point x0
for feature j. We make the following definitions by stacking
dyj , Hj , and covariance matrix Qj for N features observed
in the current frame:
dy =
dy1...
dyN
 ,Q =
Q1 . . .
QN
 ,H =
H1...
HN
 . (9)
The stacked version of Eq. 8 is:
dy = H · dx + e (10)
where
e ∼ N (0, Q). (11)
We define information matrix W which is the inverse of Q:
W = Q−1 (12)
The estimated perturbation is the weighted least squares
solution of Eq. 10, which is:
dxˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWdy. (13)
The residual can be further calculated as follows:
 = dy −Hdxˆ = (I−H(HTWH)−1HTW)dy. (14)
However, if we have outliers in the measurements, Eq.10 is
rewritten as:
dy = H · dx + e + f (15)
where f ∈ R3N is the fault vector which models the error in
the measurements under the assumption that there are outliers
in the measurements [8]. Eq. 14 has to be rewritten to be:
 = (I−H(HTWH)−1HTW)(dy − f) (16)
We then calculate the weighted sum of squares residual:
λ = TW. (17)
We can use λ to determine whether outliers exist in the
measurement set and
√
λ is defined as the test statistic. If
there are no outliers in the measurement data, λ follows a
central χ2 distribution with n−m degrees of freedom based
on the Parity Space Method [9]. Here, n is the number of
measurements and m is the number of states, and in the case
of vision-based localization n = 3N and m = 6. If there
are outliers in the measurements, λ follows a non-central
χ2 distribution. The weighted sum of squares residual, λ,
can be used to determine whether the position solution
is outlier-free. A false alarm threshold δ can be selected
analytically based on a desired probability of false alarm
Pfa, by computing the 1 − Pfa quantile of the central χ2
distribution with 3N − 6 degrees of freedom. If λ < δ, the
test indicates that the measurements are consistent with each
other and it is hypothesized that there is no outlier in the
measurement set, and if λ > δ, there is a 1−Pfa probability
that there are one or more outliers in the measurement set.
If the measurement set passes the outlier detection algo-
rithm, we can directly calculate the protection level in III-C.
If it is found that the measurement set contains outliers, we
need to perform outlier rejection. Unlike GNSS applications
where it is rare for two satellites to fail at the same time, the
outlier ratio for visual measurements is significantly higher.
As a result, a different approach is required to remove the
outliers in the measurements for vision-based localization.
We modify the approach in [7] and propose the Iterative
Parity Space Outlier Rejection (IPSOR) method to remove
multiple outliers for integrity monitoring. Both algorithms
calculate the weighted sum of squares residual on a group
of measurements and remove outliers iteratively until the
remaining measurements pass the residual threshold test.
Specifically, the IPSOR strategy removes the feature that
contributes the most to the test statistic iteratively and
classifies them as outliers until the test statistic λ is less
than the threshold δ given the number of measurements.
Afterward, we classify the remaining measurements as inliers
and calculate the test statistic again. If the updated test
statistic is less than the updated threshold δ, the outlier
rejection is completed. Otherwise, we repeat this process. If
the number of inliers is less than a threshold in this process,
we deem that there are too many outliers in the measurements
and the localization position is unsafe. This method relies
on the assumption that inlier measurements agree with each
other and outlier measurements vary much more widely.
Using the Gauss-Newton algorithm, the IPSOR method can
be applied iteratively to obtain a better linearization state x0
and avoid removing inliers.
C. Protection Level Calculation
In visual localization, we define protection level as the
maximum translational error in each direction that the outlier
detection algorithm is not expected to detect, denoted as
PLx, PLy , PLz , and they have to take account of both
errors introduced by possible outliers and noise. A protection
level for the total distance can also be calculated using the
same approach, but we use axis-specific protection levels
so that we can compare with 3σ method. We follow and
modify the approach proposed by Walter [4] and Angus [11]
to calculate the protection level. Once the measurements pass
the outlier rejection algorithm, we assume that there will be
at most one feature outlier in the measurements. It is unlikely
for the measurements to pass the outlier rejection test if
there is more than 1 faulty feature in the measurements. In
addition, depending on the application, we can always take
account of a higher number of faulty features to obtain a
more conservative protection level.
To analytically determine PLx, PLy , PLz , we follow the
problem formulation of [11]. Because each feature produces
3 measurements, we denote the fault vector f in Eq. 15 as
f = Pjf
∗ (18)
where f∗ ∈ R3 , and Pj ∈ R3N×3 in which each 3 × 3
matrix represents a feature. For Pj , the jth 3 × 3 matrix
is an identity matrix, and the rest of the 3 × 3 matrices are
matrices of zeros. For example, if the first feature is an outlier
and the rest of the features are inliers, then Pj , is defined as
Algorithm 1 Given a set of N 3D features Y and an initial
state estimate x0, we can obtain a set of inliers Yinlier which
pass the outlier detection algorithm using IPSOR method.
1: Yinlier ← Y
2: H← [ ∂∂xh(x)1|x0 , ∂∂xh(x)2|x0 . . . ∂∂xh(x)N |x0 ]
3: dy← [dy1 dy2 . . . dyN ]
4: dxˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWdy
5:  = dy −Hdxˆ = (I−H(HTWH)−1HTW)dy
6: λ← TW
7: δ ← χ2(3N−6,1−Pfa)
8: while λ > δ do
9: for j < N do
10: λi(j)← Tj W (j, j)j
11: j ← j + 1
12: end for
13: while λ > δ do
14: λmax ← max(λi(j))
15: i∗ ← arg max
i
(λi(j))
16: λ← λ− λmax
17: N ← N − 1
18: Yinlier ← Yinlier − Yi∗
19: δ ← χ2(3N−6,1−Pfa)
20: end while
21: if NI < NT then
22: Break
23: end if
24: H← [ ∂∂xh(x)1|x0 , ∂∂xh(x)2|x0 . . . ∂∂xh(x)Ninlier |x0 ]
25: dy← [dy1 dy2 . . . dyNinlier ]
26: dxˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWdy
27:  = dy −Hdxˆ = (I−H(HTWH)−1HTW)dy
28: λ← TW
29: δ ← χ2(3N−6,1−Pfa)
30: end while
Pj = P1 =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
...
...
...
0 0 0

. (19)
The weighted sum of squares residual λf that is introduced
by the fault vector f can be calculated as:
λf = f
TSf = f∗TPTSPf∗ (20)
where
S = W(I−H(HTWH)−1HTW). (21)
Based on Eq.13, the square of the outlier-induced error (εf )2
in the localization solution introduced by the fault vector f
can also be calculated as:
(εf )
2 = fTDif = f
∗TPTDiPf∗ (22)
where Di depends on the direction and can be calculated
as follows assuming the first three components of the pose
correspond to the position:
Di = WH(H
TWH)−1ATi Ai(H
TWH)−1HTW (23)
A1 =
[
1 0 0 0 0 0
]
(24)
A2 =
[
0 1 0 0 0 0
]
(25)
A3 =
[
0 0 1 0 0 0
]
. (26)
where i = 1, 2, 3 for x-direction, y-direction, and z-direction,
respectively. From Eq. 22, we find a larger vector f∗ intro-
duces a larger error in the localization solution. However, be-
cause the outlier rejection test is passed, the maximum value
of f∗TPTSPf∗ is constrained to be less than δ. As a result,
the vector f∗ introduced by the outlier needs to allocated to
maximize the outlier-induced error in the solution while still
meeting the condition that f∗TPTSPf∗ = δ [11]. The square
of the outlier-induced error that the protection level takes
account of can be determined by solving the optimization
problem:
max
f∗,Pj∈P
f∗TPTj DiPjf
∗
s.t. f∗TPTj SPjf
∗ = δ.
(27)
According to [11], we can eliminate f∗ from the equation
and simplify this constrained optimization problem to an
unconstrained optimization problem as follows:
max
Pj∈P
Λmax(Di,Pj ,S)δ (28)
where Λmax(Di,Pj ,S) is the largest eigenvalue of
PTj DiPj(P
T
j SPj)
−1. (29)
We can iterate through all the features to find the Pj that
gives the maximum value of Eq. 28, which is defined as:
P∗ = arg max
Pj∈P
Λmax(Di,Pj ,S)δ . (30)
As a result, the component of the protection level that takes
account of the outlier-induced error can be found as:
εf =
√
Λmax(Di,P∗,S)δ. (31)
The noise-induced error, εn, in the localization solution can
be calculated using the following equations:
εn = k
√
[(HTWH)−1]i,i (32)
where i = 1, 2, 3 for x-direction, y-direction, z-direction,
respectively, and k is the number of standard deviations
corresponding to the specified detection probability Pd. In
real-life applications, Pd is normally set to be 99.73% and
the corresponding k = 3. Incorporating both the outlier-
induced error and the noise-induced error, we can define the
protection level for visual localization as follows:
PLi = εf + εn (33)
=
√
Λmax(Di,P∗,S)δ + k
√
[(HTWH)−1]i,i (34)
where i = 1, 2, 3 for x-direction, y-direction, and z-
direction, respectively. PLx, PLy , PLz are equal to PL1,
PL2, and PL3, respectively.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The best error bound for an estimation process should
be as tight as possible while still bounding the error at
all times. However, for nonlinear systems with outliers, it
is not possible to guarantee that a proposed bound will
successfully bound the true error at all times. There are
currently no existing error bound metrics that quantitatively
evaluate potential error bound performance. We therefore
propose a novel relaxed bound tightness (RBT) metric that
quantitatively evaluates the performance of error bounds for
applications where the error is assumed to follow a Gaussian
distribution. The metric, Z , is calculated as follows:
Z =
√∑N
i=1 %(
νi−ei
σi
)2
N
(35)
where νi and ei are respectively the error bound and the
error for a sample i, N is the number of samples, σi is
the covariance of the error for the given sample, and % is a
weight function defined as follows:
% =
{
1 νi ≥ ei
τ νi < ei
. (36)
Because the error is supposed to be an upper bound rather
than a prediction of the expectation of the errors, the weight
function % should penalize error bounding failures more
heavily than loose bounds. The coefficient τ decides to what
extent the metric favors a tight error bound with a higher
probability of failure over a conservative bound with a low
probability of failure and vice versa, and is set to depend on
a user-defined detection probability Pd. This probability Pd
is the minimum probability that the method correctly bounds
the error required by the user.
To determine the value of τ , we assume the error follows
a Gaussian distribution without outliers. Let Φ−1 be the
quantile function for a Gaussian distribution, and define the
ideal error bound, υ∗, to be
υ∗ = Φ−1
(
1− 1− Pd
2
)
. (37)
This choice of bound corresponds exactly with the definition
of the detection probability Pd for a Gaussian distribution.
Given the bound, υ∗, we now solve for the value of τ
that minimizes the metric Z . Note that in the RBT metric,
because we divide the difference of the bound and the true
errors by the covariance for each sample, the value of τ is
independent of the value of σi given that the error is assumed
to follow a Gaussian distribution.
For a safety-critical application, Pd should be defined
close to 100% such that this metric prefers a method that
is conservative, but is able to correctly bound the error for a
higher percentage of time. For applications where safety is
less critical, Pd can be defined less aggressively, such that
the metric favors a method that provides tighter bounds but
might fail to bound the error at certain times.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to validate the proposed method and determine if
the protection level correctly bounds the translational errors
in each direction, we perform experiments on the machine
hall sequences in the well-known EuRoC dataset [19]. The
EuRoC dataset is collected using a micro aerial vehicle
(MAV), and the ground truth poses of the MAV in the
machine hall are captured by a Leica MS50 laser tracker.
We take advantage of the localization mode of ORB-
SLAM2 [1] and add the proposed outlier rejection and
protection level calculation modules. We first construct the
map using the ground truth poses and then run the local-
ization mode of ORB-SLAM2 with the proposed integrity
monitoring algorithm to obtain the estimated poses and the
protection levels for each frame. For stereo vision-based
localization, no initialization is needed to recover the scale.
As a result, we start the estimation when the MAV is static
after the initialization phase at the start of each sequence.
Afterwards, we align the ground truth with the estimated
trajectory and evaluate the error. Finally, we compare the
protection level and 3σ bound in each direction with the
true translational error for each frame.
In this experiment, the false alert probability Pfa is set
to be 0.05 and k in Eq. 32 is set to be 3, which are the
typical values used for robotics applications [20]. In ORB-
SLAM2, the covariance matrix Qj for each feature is related
to the scale at which the keypoint is extracted [1]. Because
ORB-SLAM2 is a vision only SLAM algorithm, it is the
relative value between the covariances of the features that
decides their importance in determining the pose of the
camera rather than the absolute value of the covariances. At
first, we perform the experiments using the default ORB-
SLAM2 covariance value, which is set to be 1 pixel for
features detected in the base scale level. Fig. 1 shows the
protection level, 3σ bound, and the true errors in the z-
direction for the entire trajectory of MH 01 easy using the
1-pixel assumption. It is found that the protection level is able
to bound the error for more than 95% of the frames but the
3σ is only able to bound around 50% of the frames. Possible
causes for this drastic failure of the 3σ bound are first that
there are outlier features in these frames where the 3σ does
not bound the error and second that the covariance assumed
for the inlier measurement noise on the measurement model
is too small. To avoid the second case, we perform the
experiments with the assumptions of 1, 1.5 and 2 pixel
covariance for features detected in the base scale level. These
are the typical values used for the covariance of the camera
measurement model [21], [22].
In Fig. 2, we compare the protection level method and
the 3σ method by plotting the cumulative distribution of
the difference between the error bound and the true error
in x-direction for different assumptions of the measurement
covariance values. The ideal error bound would be entirely
contained on the positive side of the x-axis in the plot,
because we want the error bound to bound the true error
exclusively, and also distributed as close to 0 as possible,
Fig. 1: Protection Level, 3σ and errors vs. frames in z-
direction for the MH easy 01 sequence in EuRoc dataset
using 1-pixel covariance assumption. The 3σ approach only
correctly bounds the error around 54%, and the protection
level correctly bounds the error for more than 95%.
because we want the error bound to be as tight as possible.
The intersection between the curves and the vertical line
x = 0 gives the percentage of frames that the error bound
method fails to bound the error. As expected, the protection
level provides a more conservative error bound compared
with 3σ but is able to bound the error for a higher percentage
of frames. If we use the 1-pixel assumption, which is the
default covariance value of ORB-SLAM2, we find that 3σ is
only able to correctly bound the error in x-direction for about
35% of the frames for MH 01 easy, 54% for MH 02 easy,
22% for MH 03 medium, 43% for MH 04 difficult, and 45%
for MH 05 difficult. However, the protection level is able to
bound the error about 85% for MH 03 medium, and around
95% for the rest of the sequences. If we use 1.5-pixel and 2-
pixel assumptions, the 3σ method is able to correctly bound
at a higher percentage rate but still significantly less than the
protection level method, which correctly bounds the error at
approximately 95% for MH 03 medium and near 100% for
the rest of the sequences. Similar results hold for y-direction
and z-direction.
We also compare the proposed protection level with the
3σ method using the metric proposed in Sec. IV. We set
the parameter Pd to be 99.73%, because this is one of
the most commonly used detection probabilities in real-life
applications and also corresponds with the 3σ bound used
for comparison. Since we determine the penalty coefficient
τ in the metric using Gaussian distribution and choose Pd
to be 99.73%, the metric favors 3σ method if the error
truly follows a zero-mean Gaussian distribution. However,
from Table I, it is found that the proposed protection level
outperforms the 3σ method for all sequences for all 3
covariance assumptions. The results show that feature-based
visual measurements are susceptible to error, and thus the
error in the position solution does not perfectly follow a
(a) MH 01 easy (b) MH 02 easy
(c) MH 03 medium (d) MH 04 difficult
(e) MH 05 difficult
Fig. 2: Cumulative distribution plots for the difference between the error bound and the error for the machine hall sequences
in the EuRoc dataset. Compared with 3σ method, the protection level correctly bounds the error for a higher percentage of
frames for all sequences.
Gaussian distribution. Further, the protection level approach
is able to correctly bound the error at a higher percentage
rate and outperform 3σ on the chosen metric.
The results for both protection level and 3σ are signifi-
cantly worse for the MH 03 medium sequence, because the
true errors obtained in this sequence are significantly larger
than other sequences. The hypothesis is that the map points
might contain a number of errors for this sequence. To verify
this hypothesis, we perform the experiments using the map
constructed by the SLAM mode of ORB-SLAM2, instead
of the map constructed using ground truth, and evaluate
the localization solution against the SLAM solution instead
of the ground truth poses, which removes the effect of
the map errors on the solution. For the MH 03 medium
sequence, it is found that the translation RSME is 0.011
m in this case which is much smaller than 0.032 m which
is the RSME obtained if we evaluate the errors against the
ground truth. The performance for protection level in the x-
direction evaluated using the proposed metric is 17.8, 18.4,
and 18.7 for the 1-pixel, 1.5-pixel, and 2-pixel assumptions,
respectively, while the performance for the 3σ approach is
90.0, 43.2, and 23.2. The protection level still outperforms
the 3σ method using the proposed RBT metric. The same
holds for the other two directions and other sequences.
We notice that although protection level is able to bound
the error better, it produces a looser error bound compared
TABLE I: Performance comparison using the proposed RBT metric
Sequence Axis 1 pixel 1.5 pixels 2 pixelsPL 3σ PL 3σ PL 3σ
MH 01 easy
x 126.2 398.0 38.1 235.1 17.4 159.3
y 59.8 358.3 18.8 203.1 19.0 134.5
z 127.3 206.0 45.7 104.6 25.7 68.6
MH 02 easy
x 121.2 317.3 30.8 179.1 20.3 103.8
y 60.5 353.9 25.2 205.7 21.7 134.8
z 95.2 221.2 25.7 125.0 23.7 71.1
MH 03 medium
x 1053.5 1277.5 641.1 830.1 441.0 607
y 682.2 971.8 389.3 622.7 252.3 449.8
z 1056.1 1265.3 609.1 819.9 397.0 598.5
MH 04 difficult
x 143.8 340.9 48.1 200.9 21.8 132.6
y 105.3 336.6 41.9 199.5 26.3 133.4
z 89.8 165.5 48.7 88.7 32.2 53.8
MH 05 difficult
x 51.8 256.6 25.6 146.9 21.8 132.6
y 30.0 215.3 28.3 118.1 26.3 133.4
z 50.1 173.3 26.9 93.8 32.2 53.8
with 3σ. The potential issue is that it could result in more
false positive warnings during the operation. We believe the
selection of the error bound should depend on the safety
standard of the application, and the proposed protection level
is more suitable for life-critical applications.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work presents an integrity monitoring algorithm to
estimate the maximum possible translational error in the
visual localization solution. The framework is inspired by
RAIM and modified to fit the problem formulation of visual
localization. It first detects outliers based on the Parity Space
Method and then calculates the maximum possible error
the outlier detection algorithm is not expected to detect.
In addition, we proposed a relaxed bound tightness metric
to quantitatively evaluate the performance of error bounds.
Finally, by performing experiments on the EuRoC dataset
and evaluating the results using the proposed metric, it is
determined that the proposed protection level produces more
reliable bounds than the typical 3σ method and provides
an approach to assess the integrity of the solution. Future
work will include taking the uncertainty of the map and pos-
sible incorrect feature covariance into considerations when
calculating protection level, and also further developing the
concept to provide integrity monitoring for visual odometry.
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